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1. Introduction 
Reference-dependent utility has attracted considerable attention in the literature since 
the introduction of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979) and disappointment 
aversion (Bell, 1985; Gul, 1991). Despite the difference between these two preferences 
(Ang et al., 2005), they have a common feature that losses (disappointments) are weighted 
more than gains (elations). Many studies show that loss aversion can be used to explain 
decision making in finance and economics (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2001; Lien and 
Wang, 2002; Lien and Wang, 2003; Berkelaar et al., 2004; Ang et al., 2005; Fielding and 
Stracca, 2007; Hwang and Satchell, 2010; Routledge and Zin, 2010; Giorgi and Post, 
2011; Pagel, 2015).  
Notwithstanding the popularity of reference-dependent utility, its applications in fi-
nance are not as straightforward as those of the conventional utility because of unknown 
parameters inherent in the reference-dependent utility. A typical approach is to estimate 
loss aversion for given values of other parameters (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; 
Abdellaoui et al., 2007; Fielding and Stracca, 2007; Tom et al., 2007; Booij and van de 
Kuilen, 2009; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Hwang and Satchell, 2010). Others estimate 
loss aversion or subjective probability weighting from lottery-choice questions using sur-
veys or experiments (e.g., Rieger et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2017). Although lottery-choice 
questions have merits that loss aversion can be estimated independently of other behav-
ioral attitudes under a controlled situation, they may not properly simulate monetary in-
centives or stress in real investment decision making. This may raise concerns for weak 
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correlations between estimated risk attitudes and actual risk-taking behaviors (Lönnqvist 
et al., 2015).  
We investigate loss aversion around the world using asset allocation of pension funds. 
Pension funds are widely used as a representative agent for asset allocation problems 
(Canner et al., 1997; Campbell and Viceira, 2002). Their asset allocations reflect strategic 
decisions of boards of trustees or regulations of countries over long investment horizons, 
and thus are less dependent on the market conditions but would show cultural traits of 
countries.  
For this purpose, we propose a novel method to estimate loss aversion together with 
other preference parameters in a multiple asset allocation problem where the optimal in-
vestment weights in risky assets are jointly influenced by loss aversion, risk aversion, and 
subjective probability weighting in addition to the performance of each asset class. With-
out considering the performance of asset classes, the difference in asset allocation may be 
misinterpreted as difference in investor preferences. We then investigate if the loss aver-
sion we estimate using pension funds is associated with wealth level or cultural dimen-
sions. If the way in which we express emotion is largely connected to our culture 
 3 
 
(Matsumoto et al., 2008; Mauss and Butler, 2010), then differences in loss aversion may 
be also motivated by cultural differences defined by Hofstede (2001).1  
The reference-dependent utility function we use in this study consists of wealth utility 
as well as gain-loss utility, in which loss aversion, risk aversion, and subjective probabil-
ity weighting are parameterized. The wealth utility reflects the absolute pleasure of con-
sumption that has been used in the literature, and helps to avoid misleading results by 
ignoring utility from consumption (Barberis, 2013). Assuming that the gain-loss utility is 
additively separable for different asset classes as in Koszegi and Rabin (2007), and inter-
preting the gain-loss utility as a risk measure (Jia and Dyer, 1996), we obtain a nonlinear 
relationship among the optimal investment proportions, loss aversion, risk aversion, the 
expected excess returns, and the sensation of losses or gains. Using the first order condi-
tions of the optimal asset allocation in pension funds, we estimate three parameters (loss 
aversion, risk aversion, and subjective probability weighting) simultaneously using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
Our empirical results show that the average values (standard deviations) of loss aver-
sion, risk aversion, and probability weighting of 31 OECD countries are 1.74 (0.64), 1.42 
(0.13) and 0.78 (0.20), respectively. The estimates of loss aversion and subjective proba-
bility weighting are similar to those reported by Wang et al. (2017) and Rieger et al. 
                                                             
1 Investigating the interaction between risk preferences and cultural measures has been 
significantly promoted in the last few years (Rieger et al., 2011; Rieger et al., 2015; Wang 
et al., 2017). 
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(2011), respectively. However, due to the differences in the estimation methods and deci-
sion makers, pension fund managers show the following distinct preferences with respect 
to those reported in the literature.   
We find that loss aversion increases with wealth. When loss aversion is regressed on 
GDP per capita (as the proxy for wealth), the coefficient is positive and significant after 
controlling several other economic variables. This result is different from those of Wang 
et al. (2017) who do not find a significant relationship between loss aversion and wealth. 
Our results support that wealthier investors suffer higher disutility from disappointing 
outcomes.   
Individualistic countries are more loss averse than collectivistic countries. This is 
consistent with the view that individualistic investors tend to be overconfident of their 
expectations in risky assets, making themselves more disappointed for losses 
(Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Chui et al., 2010; Frijns et al., 2013; Breuer et al., 2014). 
However, we do not find empirical evidence that loss aversion is affected by other cultural 
dimensions such as masculinity, power distance, or uncertainty avoidance (Wang et al., 
2017).   
Interestingly, cultural dimensions affect asset allocation in pension funds. Countries 
whose individualism or masculinity is high prefer asset classes with slightly more risky 
but higher returns to bonds, whereas countries that dislike uncertainty prefer bonds to 
risky equities. Although bonds are not risk-free, pension fund managers prefer them as 
choices of risk-avoiding against equities and other investments. 
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Our main contribution is to provide a new method that can be used to estimate di-
rectly investor preferences. Many studies have conducted surveys or laboratory experi-
ments with students in the fields of decision theory or psychology. However, differences 
exist in the way the decision makers behave in experiments and in real financial markets 
(Levitt and List, 2007; Lönnqvist et al., 2015), because it is difficult to design experiments 
that include important components in practice, e.g., decision making with a large dollar 
amount of investment. Despite the similarities between our estimates of loss aversion and 
subjective probability weighting and those reported in the literature, we also find some 
differences in the preferences.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we propose 
our reference-dependent utility function and show how the optimal asset allocation in 
risky assets is affected by investor preferences. In Section 3, we report our estimates and 
investigate loss aversion with respect to wealth and cultural dimensions. Section 4 con-
cludes the paper. 
 
2. Asset Allocation with Reference-Dependent Utility  
 
A reference-dependent utility is proposed to investigate how assets are allocated with 
respect to loss aversion, risk aversion, and subjective probability weighting. As in 
Koszegi and Rabin (2007), investors’ utility depends on multi-dimensional wealth port-
folios as well as reference dependent portfolios.  
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2.1. The Model of a Reference-Dependent Utility 
The reference-dependent utility, 𝑢(𝑊, 𝜇𝑤) , in this study consists of the typical 
wealth utility and the gain-loss utility as follows:2  
𝑢(𝑊, 𝜇𝑤) ≡ 𝜇𝑤 − 𝜑[𝐴|𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤|
𝑣𝐼− − |𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤|
𝑣(1 − 𝐼−)],        (1) 
where 𝑊 represents the end-of-period wealth, 𝜇𝑤 is the expected wealth, and 𝐼
− is an 
indicator variable that equals one when W − 𝜇𝑤 < 0, and zero otherwise. For loss aver-
sion, 𝐴 > 1 is required to give extra weights on the sensation of loss.  
The first component of the reference-dependent utility is the expected end-of-period 
wealth 𝜇𝑤 which represents utility from consumption via wealth. As suggested by Jia and 
Dyer (1996), Koszegi and Rabin (2007), and Barberis (2013), neglecting the absolute 
pleasure of consumption surely leads to biased conclusions. Our reference-dependent util-
ity increases linearly with the expected wealth, satisfying the non-satiation condition, and 
allowing our model to be tractable (Barberis, 2013). As required for the utility of con-
sumption bundle of Koszegi and Rabin (2007), the wealth utility (expected wealth) is 
                                                             
2 For an application of the reference-dependent utility in the asset allocation problem, we 
use wealth to represent consumption. When power utility is used in the gain-loss utility, 
the optimal investment proportion obtained from using wealth is not different from that 
with consumption because of its constant relative risk aversion (Campbell and Viceira, 
2002).  
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differentiable and strictly increasing. This linear wealth utility makes the risk-return rela-
tionship clear in our reference-dependent frame. For example, when the popular hyper-
bolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) class of utility functions such as power utility or 
log-utility is used as wealth utility (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2001; Gomes, 2005; Pagel, 
2015), we have two risks in our reference-dependent utility: one from the concavity of 
the HARA class, and the other included in the gain-loss utility that is explained below.  
The second component inside the square brackets in Eq. (1), which we refer to as the 
gain-loss utility, represents utility derived from gains and losses. We use the expected 
wealth as the reference point in the gain-loss utility for tractability. According to Koszegi 
and Rabin (2007), using expectations as the reference point would explain investors’ be-
havior better than the status quo, and moreover, simplifies the optimization problem in 
asset allocation. The curvature parameter, 𝑣, decides convexity or concavity of sensation 
in the domain of either gains or losses. As in many previous studies, the curvature param-
eters for gains and losses are set equivalent to each other (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; 
Abdellaoui, 2000; Barberis et al., 2001; Ang et al., 2005; Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt, 
2007).  
The expected gain-loss utility, i.e., the expectation of the second component in Eq. 
(1), stands for risk. For example, when 𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤 is symmetric, the expected gain-loss 
utility, 
(𝐴−1)
2
𝔼[|𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤|
𝑣], is equivalent to absolute deviation (𝑣 = 1) or variance (𝑣 =
2 ). The expected gain-loss utility represents the relative size of 𝐴𝔼[|𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤|
𝑣𝐼−] 
to 𝔼[|𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤|
𝑣(1 − 𝐼−)], and thus includes information for the asymmetric distribution 
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of wealth. This expected gain-loss utility has been interpreted as risk in the literature. 
Luce and Weber (1986) use a piecewise power utility to model perceived risk affected by 
losses more than by gains. Jia and Dyer (1996) elucidate that the expected gain-loss utility 
is a special case of their standard measure of risk. The expected gain-loss utility repre-
sents a measurable uncertainty (Knight, 1921) in which losses are weighted more than 
gains.  
Our interpretation of risk and loss, measured by 𝔼[𝐴|𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤|
𝑣𝐼− − |𝑊 −
𝜇𝑤|
𝑣(1 − 𝐼−)] and 𝔼[|𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤|
𝑣𝐼−], respectively, indicates that these two are not inde-
pendent of each other in our reference-dependent utility. This is not surprising since the 
expected loss with respect to a reference point has been used as a risk measure (downside 
risk) in the literature (Roy, 1952; Markowitz, 1959; Fishburn, 1977). The experimental 
results in Thaler et al. (1997) and Anzoni and Zeisberger (2017) clearly show that inves-
tors are relatively more risk averse for investments that entail potential losses.  
With this interpretation, the parameter 𝜑 represents risk aversion, the trade-off re-
lationship between the wealth utility and risk. The parameter 𝐴, on the other hand, speci-
fies aversion to the relative sensation of loss to gain. When 𝐴 increases, the expected 
gain-loss utility is dominated by lower partial moments, indicating that downside risk can 
be regarded as an extreme relative sensation of loss to gain as the sensation of gain be-
comes relatively negligible. Therefore, while 𝜑 represents aversion to a measurable un-
certainty, 𝐴 measures the relative sensation of loss to gain for given uncertainty.  
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2.2. Probability Transformation 
It is well-documented that people distort probabilities by disproportionately directing 
their attention to outcomes. According to the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), unlikely extreme outcomes are overweighed while highly 
possible events are underweighted. In order to simulate investors’ subjective weights, 
suppose a single-parameter weighting function of Prelec (1998) in the gain-loss utility of 
Eq. (1):  
𝑤(𝐹(𝑥)) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−(− 𝑙𝑛(𝐹(𝑥)))𝛿],                  (2)   
where 𝐹(𝑥) is the cumulative probability of any possible outcome 𝑥 , 𝑥 = 𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤 
represents gains or losses, and 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1. The weighting function shows that unlikely 
(likely) outcomes are given more (less) weights as 𝛿 decreases. When the subjective 
weighting is applied to the gain-loss utility, the expected gain-loss utility can be presented 
as: 
𝔼[𝐴|𝑥|𝑣𝐼− − |𝑥|𝑣(1 − 𝐼−)] = 𝐴𝑝𝑢− − (1 − 𝑝)𝑢+,          (3) 
where (1 − 𝑝)𝑢+ = ∫ 𝑥𝑣𝑤′(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝑓(𝑥)
∞
0
𝑑𝑥 , 𝑝𝑢− = ∫ (−𝑥)𝑣𝑤′(𝐹(𝑥))𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
0
−∞
 , 
𝑓(𝑥) is the probability density function, 𝑝 is the cumulative probability at the reference 
point, and 𝑤′(1 − 𝐹(𝑥)) and 𝑤′(𝐹(𝑥)) are the derivatives of Prelec’s weighting func-
tions at the cumulative probabilities of 1 − 𝐹(𝑥) and 𝐹(𝑥), respectively.  
Although the rationale behind the subjective probability weighting is different from 
that behind the curvature parameter 𝑣, these two parameters are closely connected. The 
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subjective weighting function is designed to replicate the probability distortion of out-
comes, but alters the degree of risk attitude towards gains and losses with respect to the 
true probability, because 𝑥𝑣[𝑤′(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))𝑓(𝑥)] = [𝑥𝑣𝑤′(1 − 𝐹(𝑥))]𝑓(𝑥) . In other 
words, for the true probability density function (𝑓(𝑥)), the subjective weighting function 
when combined with the value function of outcomes, 𝑥𝑣𝑤′(1 − 𝐹(𝑥)), can create con-
cavity for losses and gains. Even though risk-aversion for gains and risk-loving for losses 
are assumed for a given subjective weighting function, the net effects of the risk attitude 
and the subjective weighting function become unclear under the true probability.  
2.3 Optimal Asset Allocation with Reference-dependent Utility 
The asset allocation problem for multiple asset classes (e.g., equities, bonds, cash, 
and other investments) in this study is a generalization of the typical asset allocation prob-
lem where only two classes of assets (e.g., equity and cash) are considered (Ang et al., 
2005; Fielding and Stracca, 2007; Hwang and Satchell, 2010). The initial wealth can be 
assumed to be 1 since the gain-loss utility with constant relative risk aversion preference 
is homogeneous in wealth. Then the end-of-period wealth 𝑊 is an outcome of a portfolio 
q, where investment proportions 𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝑛 of wealth are invested in 𝑛 risky assets, 
and the remaining (1 − ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) is invested in cash (the risk-free asset). Short positions 
are not allowed in a typical pension fund, suggesting 0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1 for all i. Let 𝑟𝑖 and 
𝑟𝑓 be the return of risky asset i and risk-free asset, respectively. Then, gains or losses with 
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respect to the expected wealth 𝜇𝑤 can be calculated by 𝑊 − 𝜇𝑤 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 (𝑟𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖), 
where 𝜇𝑖 ≡ 𝔼(𝑟𝑖).  
For the optimal asset allocation with multiple asset classes, the gain-loss utility (the 
second component of Eq. (1)) is assumed to be additively separable across different asset 
classes as in Koszegi and Rabin (2007).3 When gains and losses in each asset class are 
defined as 𝑟𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖, then the expected reference-dependent utility in Eq. (1) appears as 
follows: 
𝑈𝐷𝐴 = 1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖(𝜇𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓)
𝑛
𝑖=1 − 𝜑[𝐴 ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑢𝑖
−𝑛
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑣(1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑢𝑖
+𝑛
𝑖=1 ],   (4) 
where 𝑝𝑖 is the cumulative probability at the reference point for risky asset 𝑖.  
Proposition 1 For the expected reference-dependent utility in Eq. (4), when 𝑣 > 1, the 
optimal investment proportion with respect to risky asset 𝑖 is as follows: 
𝛼𝑖
∗ = (
𝜇𝑖−𝑟𝑓
𝜑𝑣(𝐴𝑝𝑖𝑢𝑖
−−(1−𝑝𝑖)𝑢𝑖
+)
)
1
𝑣−1
.           (5) 
Proof. When investors maximize their expected reference-dependent utility, the first or-
der condition is 
𝜕𝑈𝐷𝐴
∂𝛼𝑖 
= (𝜇𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓) − 𝜑𝑣𝛼𝑖
𝑣−1(𝐴𝑝𝑖𝑢𝑖
− − (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑢𝑖
+) = 0,        (6) 
                                                             
3 If investment experience is thought of a series of separate episodes as in Barberis and 
Xiong (2012), or if investors are inclined to narrow framing (Kahneman and Lovallo, 
1993; Kahneman, 2003), then the gain-loss utility of an asset class can be considered 
separately from that of other asset classes. 
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from which we have the results in Eq. (5). The Hessian matrix for the second order con-
dition becomes a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are:  
∂2𝑈𝐷𝐴
∂α𝑖
2 
= −α𝑖
𝑣−2𝜑𝑣(𝑣 − 1)(𝐴𝑝𝑖𝑢𝑖
− − (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑢𝑖
+), 
which is 
∂2𝑈𝐷𝐴
∂α𝑖
2 
|
𝛼𝑖=α𝑖
∗
= −(𝜇𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓)(𝑣 − 1)α𝑖
∗−1 < 0, 
under the assumption that 𝑣 > 1, because the expected returns of risky assets are higher 
than that of the risk-free asset and 0 < α𝑖
∗ ≤ 1. Therefore, the optimal investment pro-
portion in Eq. (5) satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition when 𝑣 > 1.    QED 
The results are interesting because 𝑣 > 1 implies that investors are locally risk-seek-
ing in gains and risk averse in losses. The reversed S-shape gain-loss utility is similar to 
the utility function of Markowitz (1952), Post et al. (2008), and Hwang and Satchell 
(2010). Although simple models without the level of wealth or with the assumption of 
𝑣 = 1  are popular in the literature for their tractability (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; 
Barberis et al., 2001; Pagel, 2015), they often produce corner solutions in asset allocation 
problems (Ang et al., 2005; Hwang and Satchell, 2010). This problem can be circum-
vented by including the expected wealth and allowing 𝑣 > 1 . The condition 𝑣 > 1 , 
however, also causes problems in the optimization due to the non-concavity of the utility 
function in losses (Shefrin, 2008). As explained by Thaler et al. (1997), the curvature 
parameter 𝑣 (risk aversion or loving in the domain of either gain or loss) is only mild, 
and many studies assume 𝑣 = 1.   
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The semi-elasticity of 𝐴 with respect to 𝜑, 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐴
𝜕𝜑
= −
(𝜇𝑖−𝑟𝑓)
𝜑(𝜇𝑖−𝑟𝑓)+(1−𝑝𝑖)𝑣𝜑
2𝛼𝑣−1𝑢𝑖
+ < 0, 
suggests that loss aversion (𝐴) increases when risk aversion (𝜑) decreases although both 
loss aversion and risk aversion decrease the optimal investment proportion (𝛼𝑖
∗). This 
confirms our earlier explanation in Section 2.1 that loss aversion and risk aversion are not 
independent of each other. Moreover, if investors become more risk tolerant as wealth 
increases, their loss aversion decreases. Later, in the empirical tests, we investigate if 
wealthier investors suffer higher disutility from disappointing outcomes.  
2.4 Estimation of Loss Aversion Parameters 
The optimal investment proportion in Eq. (5) is a non-linear function of loss aversion 
(𝐴), risk aversion (𝜑), the expected excess return of risky asset i, curvature (𝑣) and sub-
jective probability weighting (𝛿) that are included in the expected sensation of gain (𝑢𝑖
+) 
and loss (𝑢𝑖
−) as in Eq. (3). The lack of clarity between curvature and subjective weighting 
parameters explained in subsection 2.2 clearly shows difficulties in estimating all four 
parameters 𝐴, 𝜑, 𝛿 and 𝑣 at the same time.  
In order to minimize the difficulties in the estimation but keep the original rationale 
behind the reference-dependent utility, we estimate loss aversion (𝐴), risk aversion (𝜑), 
and probability weighting (𝛿) simultaneously for given curvature (𝑣) and the investment 
proportions in risky assets (𝛼𝑖) and the expected excess returns (𝜇𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓) using the first 
order condition in Eq. (6) in the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework. In 
fact, it is possible to estimate any three parameters out of the four parameters (𝐴, 𝜑, 𝛿, 
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and 𝑣), because we have three orthogonality conditions from three risky asset classes in 
pension funds – equities, bonds, and other investments (we explain about the data in detail 
later). The three parameters 𝐴, 𝜑, and 𝛿 are chosen because the curvature in the do-
main of gain and loss is mild (Thaler et al., 1997) and as discussed above many studies 
simply assume 𝑣 = 1.  
Our major results are reported with 𝑣 = 1.1, which is chosen for the following rea-
sons. First, as explained by Thaler et al. (1997), if risk aversion or loving in the domain 
of either gain or loss is mild, asset allocation decision would not be sensitive to a small 
change in 𝑣. Second, our analytical results in Proposition 1 require 𝑣 > 1. For robust-
ness of the results, we have tested various other values of 𝑣, the results of which are not 
qualitatively different from those with 𝑣 = 1.1.  
Suppose the data 𝓨𝑡 = (𝑟1𝑡, 𝑟2𝑡, 𝑟3𝑡, 𝛼1𝑡, 𝛼2𝑡, 𝛼3𝑡, 𝑣)′  for the estimation of 𝜽 =
(𝐴 , 𝜑 , 𝛿)′. In the just-identified GMM specification, the (3×1) vector of orthogonality 
conditions from the first order condition in Eq. (6) are 
𝔼(ℎ(𝜽∗, 𝓨
𝑡
)) = (𝝁𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝒆) − 𝜑𝑣𝜶
𝑣−1 ∘ (𝐴𝒑 ∘ 𝒖− − (𝒆 − 𝒑) ∘ 𝒖+) = 𝟎,    (7) 
where 𝜽∗ represents the true value of 𝜽, 𝒆 = (1, 1, 1)′, and ∘ is the Hadamard product 
(each element 𝑖𝑗 is the product of elements 𝑖𝑗 of the two matrices). The sample average 
of ℎ(𝜽, 𝓨
𝑡
) is 
𝑔(𝜽; 𝓨) =
1
𝑇
∑ ℎ(𝜽, 𝓨
𝑡
)𝑇𝑡=1 , 
where  
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ℎ(𝜽, 𝓨
𝑡
) = (𝒓𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝒆) − 𝜑𝑣𝜶𝑡
𝑣−1 ∘ (𝐴 ∘ (−𝑰𝑡
− ∘ (𝒓𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡))
𝑣
∘ 𝑤′(𝒆 − 𝑭𝑡) −
(𝑰𝑡
+ ∘ (𝒓𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡))
𝑣 ∘ 𝑤′(𝑭𝑡)),           (8) 
and the elements in vector 𝑰𝑡
+ are 𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ = 1, when 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡 > 0 and zero otherwise and 
𝑰𝑖𝑡
− = 𝒆 − 𝑰𝑖𝑡
+ , respectively. For a subjective weighting function for the cumulative proba-
bility 𝑭𝑡 = 𝐹(𝒙) of outcome 𝒙 = 𝒓𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡, we use Prelec (1998) one parameter version: 
𝑤(𝐹(𝒙)) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−(− 𝑙𝑛(𝐹(𝒙)))𝛿], where 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1. The multiplier functions are  
𝑤′(𝑭𝑡) =
𝛿
𝑭𝑡
∘ (−𝑙𝑛(𝑭𝑡))
𝛿−1
∘ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−(−𝑙𝑛(𝑭𝑡))
𝛿
)  
and 
𝑤′(𝒆 − 𝑭𝑡) =
𝛿
𝒆−𝑭𝑡
∘ (−𝑙𝑛(𝒆 − 𝑭𝑡))
𝛿−1
∘ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−(−𝑙𝑛(𝒆 − 𝑭𝑡))
𝛿
), 
where 𝑭𝑡 = 𝐹(𝒓𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡).  
As 𝓨𝑡 is strictly stationary and ℎ(𝜽, 𝓨𝑡) is continuous, by the law of large numbers 
we have 
𝑔(𝜽; 𝓨) →
𝑝
E(ℎ(𝜽, 𝓨𝑡)). 
The GMM estimator ?̂? is  
    ?̂? = arg min 𝑔(𝜽; 𝓨)′?̂?𝑇
−1𝑔(𝜽; 𝓨).             (9) 
For the weighting matrix ?̂?𝑇
−1 we use  
       ?̂?𝑇
−1 = [
1
𝑇
∑𝑇𝑡=1 ℎ(?̂?, 𝓨𝑡)ℎ(?̂?, 𝓨𝑡)′]
−1
,                (10) 
which is the variance-covariance matrix of sample mean of ℎ(?̂?, 𝓨𝑡).  
We use iterated GMM to obtain the optimal estimator ?̂?. The initial weighting matrix 
is set to ?̂?𝑇
−1 = 𝑰 (the indentity matrix) and then is updated with the GMM estimate ?̂? 
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from the optimization in Eq. (9). Eqs. (9) and (10) are repeated until convergence. In the 
n-th iteration, the estimate 𝜽?̂? is found using a popular machine learning method known 
as Limited-memory BFGS.4 Since 𝑔(𝜽; 𝓨) is not a globally convex function with a 
unique minimum, local minima are possible. As a solution to this problem, we use various 
starting values and exclude any resulting estimates that have little economic sense or lead 
to large standard errors.5 The standard errors of the estimates are calculated using the 
Hessian matrix evaluated at ?̂?. The Hessian matrix is the matrix of second partial deriv-
atives of 𝑔(?̂?; 𝓨)′?̂?𝑇
−1𝑊𝑇(?̂?; 𝓨) . The square root of the diagonal terms gives us the 
standard errors of the estimates.  
 
3. Empirical Tests  
We estimate loss aversion together with risk aversion and subjective probability 
weighting using asset allocations in pension funds of 31 countries for the period from 
                                                             
4 The limited-memory in the family of Quasi-Newton methods that approximates the 
Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) algorithm using a limited amount of com-
puter memory, more details about this algorithm can be found in Liu and Nocedal (1989). 
5 An alternative method would be the Bayesian estimation with informative priors, which 
is far more complicated. The robustness of our estimates is also tested by using the loss 
aversion coefficients and the subjective probability weighting parameters reported by 
Wang et al (2017) and Rieger et al. (2015), respectively, as starting values.  
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2004 to 2015. Pension funds are widely used as a representative agent for asset allocation 
problems (Canner et al., 1997; Campbell and Viceira, 2002). Their asset allocations can 
be regarded as the optimal weights 𝛼𝑖
∗s as they are the outcome of strategic asset alloca-
tion decision of board of trustees or regulations of these countries over long investment 
horizons. Therefore, it is less dependent on the market conditions but would rather show 
cultural traits of countries, allowing us to investigate the relationship between loss aver-
sion and cultural dimensions.6  
                                                             
6 As in most other empirical tests in finance, we use ex post returns due to the difficulties 
in obtaining expected returns of various asset classes in each country. Empirical results 
with ex post returns, however, may not be necessarily consistent with the analytical results 
with ex ante returns (Elton, 1999; Fama and French, 2002). Some studies use expected 
returns estimated under the assumption of certain models (e.g., Fama and French, 2002; 
Chen, et al., 2008). However, these estimates may suffer misspecification problems when 
the choice of models or variables does not represent the full set of information. Moreover, 
the estimation of expected returns in ‘other investments’ (derivatives, infra, properties, 
etc.) is not as straightforward as those of equities or bonds. In order to minimize this 
problem, we use low frequency annual data. 
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3.1 Data 
We collect asset allocations of pension funds across 31 countries included in the 
OECD Global Pension Statistics for the period from 2004 to 2015.7 The number of coun-
tries and sampling period are restricted by the data availability of pension funds’ asset 
allocations, returns and cultural measures we consider in this study.8 The assets are 
grouped into four classes, i.e., equities, bonds, other investments, and risk-free assets, 
according to their significance in investment proportions.  
                                                             
7 The OECD launched the Global Pension Statistics Project (GPS) in 2002 for a growing 
need from policy makers, the regulatory community, and private sector participants, to 
compare programme developments and experiences to those of other countries. The sta-
tistics cover an extensive range of funded and private pension plans. The data availability 
before 2004 rapidly worsens. 
8 Among the 35 OECD countries, nine countries (Estonia, Korea, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Ireland, Slovak Rep, Portugal, Latvia and Luxembourg) are excluded because their 
asset allocation data for the entire sample period are not available. Moreover, some coun-
tries such as Estonia, Netherlands, Portugal, and Luxembourg show substantial foreign 
investments which are not clearly classified into any of our four asset classes. On the 
other hand, five non-OECD countries (Brazil, Hong Kong, Pakistan, South Africa and 
Thailand) in the OECD Global Pension Statistics are included to increase the power of 
our tests as much as possible. As the number of countries in the OECD Global Pension 
Statistics increases, a more robust analysis would be possible in the future.  
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3.1.1 Investment Weights in Asset Classes 
The investment weights (𝛼𝑖
∗) in these four asset classes are collected from OECD 
Global Pension Statistics, where national asset allocations of pension funds are main-
tained and updated annually. Investment proportions in three asset classes - equities, 
bonds, and risk-free assets - are straightforward. However, significant proportions of pen-
sion funds are invested in other investment vehicles which include, but are not limited to, 
loans, land and buildings, unallocated insurance contracts, hedge funds, private equity 
funds, structured products, and other mutual funds. Such a wide variety poses enormous 
difficulties in tracking the performance of each asset class in each country. Moreover, 
details of investment proportions in these other investment vehicles are not known. There-
fore, the investment in the assets except for equities, bonds, and risk-free assets is grouped 
and named as ‘other investments’. 
Panel A of Table I reports the average weights on asset classes for each country during 
our sampling period. On average, 45.90% of pension funds is invested in bonds, followed 
by other investments (23.63%), and equities (21.84%). The investment proportions in the 
three risky asset classes are negatively correlated (panel B). The correlation coefficients 
in the investment proportions between equities and bonds and between bonds and other 
investment are -0.54 and -0.68, respectively, and statistically significant. However, we do 
not find substitution relationship between equities and other investment whose correlation 
coefficient is close to zero, i.e., 0.04.  
3.1.2 Returns of Asset Classes 
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The returns of the four asset classes are calculated as follows using the DataStream 
database. First, equity returns are calculated from the composite index of the major stock 
exchange in each country. Table II reports that the average annual log-return (standard 
deviation, SD) of the 31 countries is 7.26% (28.43%).  
Second, bond returns are calculated with equal weight on the total returns of govern-
ment and corporate bonds. Ten-year benchmark government bonds are used as govern-
ment bonds.9 The quality of corporate bond data is not as good as that of the government 
bond data among emerging markets. To mitigate this defect, we consider three interna-
tional indexes: FTSE Euro Corporate Bond Index for those developed markets outside 
the Eurozone (Denmark, Hong Kong, Iceland, Japan and Norway); IBoxx Euro Corporate 
Bond Index for countries within the Eurozone (Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Slovenia and Spain); and finally, BofA-Merrill Lynch Emerging Markets Corporate Plus 
Index for emerging markets (Mexico, Poland, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand and Tur-
key). For the remaining countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, the United Kingdom 
and the United States), country-specific indices can be found. The average annual bond 
log-return (SD) for all countries is 5.74% (6.52%).  
Third, for other investments, considering the diversity of this asset group, we con-
struct a composite index using MSCI World Real Estate, Dow Johns Brookfield GLB 
                                                             
9 The data of ten-year government bonds is non-applicable in Turkey, hence, a similar 
bond price index with a 5-year maturity is applied.  
 21 
 
INFRA, S&P Listed Private Equity, and HFRI Fund of Funds Composite, for real estates, 
infrastructure, hedge funds, and private equities, respectively. These four return series are 
equally weighted to create the ‘other investments’ asset class. The average annualized 
log-return (SD) for other investments is 8.44% (22.72%).  
Finally, for the risk-free rates, we use 30-day T-bill rates. If T-bill returns are not 
available, 30-day interbank rates or repo-rates are used. Countries within the Eurozone 
share an identical interbank rate. Notably, high short-term interest rates are observed in a 
few countries due to their financial policies or rapid capital growth. For example, the risk-
free rates in Brazil, Iceland, South Africa and Turkey are all over 8%. High risk-free rates 
produce negative excess returns for some countries, rendering abnormal loss aversion that 
will be discussed later.  
3.1.3. National culture dimensions 
A growing number of studies have found how cultural differences affect asset pricing 
and financial decision since the cultural dimension theory developed by Geert Hofstede 
(2001). For example, individualism increases foreign investment (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 
2010), financial risk-taking (Breuer et al., 2014), and overconfidence that leads to over-
optimism towards future returns (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Van Den Steen, 2004; 
Chui et al., 2010). 
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We investigate cross-cultural variations of loss aversion using four primary cultural 
dimensions in Hofstede’s culture measures (Hofstede, 2001), i.e., individualism, mascu-
linity, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. If cultural dimensions are positively 
related with loss aversion as in Wang et al. (2017), then they may affect asset allocation 
too.  
Individualism (IDV) is a measure of the degree to which individuals are integrated 
into groups. Higher IDV indicates the more individualistic society where people have less 
social support and focus on their own abilities to differentiate themselves from others. 
According to Hsee and Weber (1999) and Chui et al. (2010), investors in individualistic 
culture are more loss averse and overconfident. On the other hand, masculinity (MAS) 
represents the distribution of preferences to a competitive or corporative society. In 
masculinity societies which are characterized by achievement, heroism, assertiveness and 
material rewards for success, investors are driven by investment performance too much 
and they become more sensitive to losses than those in feminine societies (Abdellaoui 
and Bleichrodt, 2007). The power distance (PD) refers to the extent to which less powerful 
members accept the unequal distribution of power. Higher PD refers that people tend to 
accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place without any further 
justification. Power distance would increase loss aversion because people feel more 
helpless and thus avoid losses when inequlity increases (Inesi, 2010). Finally, the 
uncertainty avoidance (UA) reflects the extent to which people feel either uncomfortable 
or comfortable in unstructured situations which are novel, unknown, surprising, and 
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ambiguous. When people are keen on avoiding uncertainty, they would become more 
sensitive to losses.  
3.2. Cross-Country Loss Aversion    
The three parameters – loss aversion, risk aversion, and subjective probability 
weighting – estimated in the presence of the performance of each asset class are reported 
in Panel A, Table III. The numbers in brackets represent the standard errors of estimates. 
In general, the estimates based on asset allocation of pension funds are similar to those 
estimated from experiments and surveys (Rieger et al., 2011; Wang et al. (2017).  
First, the average value and standard deviation of loss aversion estimates are 1.74 
and 0.64, respectively. The level is slightly lower than those suggested in the literature 
(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Pennings and Smidts, 2003; Fielding and Stracca, 
2007; Tom et al., 2007; Hwang and Satchell, 2010; Wang et al., 2017). Anomalous loss 
aversion coefficients that contradict the theoretical prediction appear in some countries, 
mainly due to the relatively low excess returns of risky assets: for example, Iceland ex-
hibits a “loss-seeking” pattern (𝐴 = −0.11). Since it is difficult to interpret loss-seeking 
behaviour, we exclude Iceland from the further analysis.10  
                                                             
10 When Iceland is omitted, the average values of 𝜆, 𝜑, and 𝛿 for the remaining 30 
countries are 1.80, 1.42, and 0.75, respectively. 
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Second, the average risk aversion parameter 𝜑 is 1.42 and the standard deviation is 
0.13. If loss aversion is disregarded, i.e., 𝐴 = 1, then the risk aversion parameter is equiv-
alent to the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk-aversion. Our estimates of risk aver-
sion that range from 1 to 1.6 are slightly lower than those suggested in the literature.11 
However, if loss aversion is negatively related with risk aversion as in Thaler et al. (1997) 
and our Proposition 1, the estimate of loss aversion or risk aversion should be lower than 
that without considering each other.  
Third, the average value of subjective weightings 𝛿 is about 0.78 with standard de-
viation of 0.2. This is close to 0.74 suggested in Gonzalez and Wu (1999). Pension fund 
managers over-estimate the probabilities of low and high returns that are unlikely whereas 
they under-estimate those around the average return. Although these pension fund man-
agers possess better knowledge of asset returns, their subjective probability weights do 
not deviate from what has been found in psychological experiments.  
How are our estimates compared with those of previous studies? For example, Wang 
et al. (2017) estimate cross-country loss aversion using a survey known as International 
Test on Risk Attitudes (INTRA), which is closely related to our goals but differs from two 
                                                             
11 Many earlier studies suggest that the admissible range of the coefficient of the constant 
relative risk aversion lies between one and two (Friend and Blume, 1975; Kydland and 
Prescott, 1982). However, in the portfolio optimization, the risk aversion parameter is 
typically assumed to be in the region of 2 to 4 (Fabozzi et al., 2007). 
 25 
 
important treatments. Firstly, they evaluate the level of loss aversion from lottery ques-
tions whereas ours are estimated using asset allocation in pension funds (i.e. real-life de-
cisions). Secondly, in Wang et al. (2017), loss aversion is estimated separately to risk 
aversion and probability weighting; in contrast, we estimate loss aversion together with 
risk aversion and probability weighting. 
Panels B and C of Table III report some statistics that compare our estimates with 
those of others in the literature. For the 27 countries, common in Wang et al. (2017) and 
our study, the Spearman correlation between these two sets of loss aversion estimates is 
0.38 and is statistically significant. Moreover, the mean (standard deviation) of our loss 
aversion estimates is 1.87 (0.52) while Wang et al. (2017) report 2.01 (0.37). The differ-
ence is not statistically significant. The subjective probability weighting parameters we 
estimate are also similar to those reported by Rieger et al. (2015). The Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient is 0.54 for the 21 countries included in Rieger et al. (2011) and our 
study, and it is statistically significant.   
Therefore, despite the differences in the utility functions used to estimate loss aver-
sion or subjective probability weighting, the methods (survey, experiment, and asset al-
location in pension funds), and decision makers (students and fund managers), it is inter-
esting to find similarities between the estimates. We argue, however, that our estimates 
would better reflect investors’ preferences towards risk and loss in practice because loss 
aversion is estimated together with both risk aversion and subjective weighting using the 
performance of major asset classes and their asset allocation decisions.  
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3.3. The effects of wealth level on loss aversion 
Using the estimates of loss aversion, we investigate if wealthier investors suffer 
higher disutility from disappointing outcomes. Despite the negative relationship between 
loss aversion and risk aversion, it is not clear if loss aversion increases with wealth. Wang 
et al. (2017) do not find any significant relationship between wealth and loss aversion 
they estimate using survey data.  
We regress the estimated loss aversion on GDP per Capita (as the proxy for wealth) 
(GDPER) as well as other control variables that represent the development of financial 
markets. The panel regression model is as follow: 
𝐿𝑁(𝐿𝐴𝑘) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑘,𝑡 
+𝛽4𝐼𝐹𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑆𝐼𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘. 
Five control variables include the scale of financial recourses (credit to private sector, as 
the % of GDP, CGDP) (Chui et al., 2010), the investable freedom index (published by the 
heritage foundation to measure stock market openness, IF) (Bekaert et al. (2007), the 
political stability (issued by the World Bank to reflect perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
PSI) (Lesmond, 2005; Eleswarapu and Venkataraman, 2006; Bekaert et al., 2007), the 
financial leverage (government’s debt to GDP ratio, DGDP), and regulatory efficiency 
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(published by the heritage foundation, which equally consists of three sub-indices: busi-
ness freedom, labor freedom and monetary freedom, RE). In the panel regression, each 
explanatory variable has 12 yearly observations for each of the 30 countries. 
Regression results in Table IV show that loss aversion is higher in wealthier coun-
tries: the coefficients on GDPER are positive and significant at the 5% level in all cases. 
The positive coefficients on CGDP, RE, and IF suggest that loss aversion is also high in 
the countries where their financial markets are advanced, or are efficient and liquid. The 
negative coefficient on DGDP implies that countries with lower loss aversion adopt ag-
gressive fiscal expending. Therefore, loss aversion increases as investors are wealthier 
and financial markets are mature.  
3.4. Attitudes in investment decision with respect to cultural dimensions 
Can loss aversion be explained by cultural dimension measures developed by Hof-
stede (2001)? Wang et al. (2017) report that individualism, power distance, and mascu-
linity increase loss aversion. To explore this question, we conduct a regression of esti-
mated loss aversion on four cultural dimensions in addition to 12-year average of GDP 
per capita (GDPER):  
𝐿𝑁 (𝐿𝐴𝑘) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑘 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐷𝑘+𝛽5𝑈𝐴𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘. 
As in Chui et al. (2010) and Wang et al. (2017), the results in Panel A of Table V 
show that loss aversion increases with individualism regardless of model specifications. 
Individualistic investors suffer more disutility from losses than collective investors do. 
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People from a more independent or overconfident culture may be less capable in dealing 
with losses (failures) and emotional regulation (e.g., Miyamoto and Ma, 2011; Miyamoto 
et al., 2014). In contrast, collectivistic people are less loss-averse in general as their cul-
ture often encourage people to support each other and set moderate goals (e.g., Cohen and 
Wills, 1985; Hsee and Weber, 1999). However, for the other three cultural dimensions, 
the relation is not significant. Interestingly, GDP per Capita (GDPER) which we use as a 
proxy for wealth is not significant in the presence of individualism, because of the high 
correlation between GDPER and IDV, i.e., 0.66.  
Our regression results in Panel B do not show any significant association between 
Hofstede’s cultural measures and the other two preference parameters, i.e., risk aversion 
and subjective probability weighting. This result is not consistent with those of Rieger et 
al. (2015) who find robust influence of culture (IDV and UA) on risk preferences that are 
estimated without disentangling potential interactions with loss aversion and subjective 
probability weighting. Since these behavior traits are difficult to be decomposed via hy-
pothetical lottery-choice questions, we argue that our results would reveal further insights 
about the three elements of prospect theory.  
3.5. Asset allocation with respect to cultural dimensions 
Finally, we test if the four cultural dimensions can directly explain investment pro-
portions in the risky assets (𝑅𝑃𝑘) using the following regression equation:  
𝑅𝑃𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑉𝑘+𝛽3𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘. 
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PD is not used as an explanatory variable because it is not significant in all cases in our 
preliminary tests.  
As reported in panel C of Table V, a higher level of individualism or uncertainty 
avoidance increases proportions in risky assets, but the masculinity makes a negligible 
impact on investment proportions in the risky assets. However, the results are different 
for different asset classes: investment in other investments increases with individualism 
and masculinity whereas investment in bonds decreases with these two. These results 
suggest that individualistic and masculinistic countries prefer high risk–high return asset 
classes to less risky assets such as bonds. By contrast, uncertainty avoidance affects in-
vestment in equities in an opposite way to that in bonds: when uncertainty avoidance 
increases, investment in bonds increases while investment in equities decreases. These 
results are consistent with the relationship in the investment proportions between the three 
asset classes in panel B of Table I: investment in other assets or equities is an alternative 
to that in bonds, but investment in equities is not related with that in other investments.  
Therefore, although we do not find evidence for the effects of cultural dimensions on 
investment in the risky assets except for individualism and uncertainty avoidance, each 
of the three asset classes respond differently to these cultural dimensions. Countries with 
high individualism or masculinity prefer asset classes with slightly more risky but higher 
returns to bonds, whereas countries that dislike uncertainty prefer bonds to risky equities. 
Although bonds are not risk-free, pension fund managers prefer them as choices of risk-
avoiding against equities and other investments.  
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3.6. Robustness Tests12 
Our main results with 𝑣 = 1.1 are based on the literature that the curvature is not 
severe, and our analytical result that requires 𝑣 > 1. However, our choice of 𝑣 is arbi-
trary and thus we further test if our main results are robust to different values of 𝑣, i.e., 
𝑣 = 1.25, 1.5 and 2. Since a larger 𝑣 represents a more risk seeking in gains, loss aver-
sion should increase with 𝑣. As expected, the average loss aversion values are 1.84, 1.95, 
and 2.32 for 𝑣 = 1.25, 1.5 and 2, respectively. On the contrary, we find no clear pattern 
in the subjective probability weighting as 𝑣 changes.  
In all three cases, the correlation coefficients between our estimated of loss aversion 
and those of Wang et al. (2017) are still positive and significant. Based on the 27 countries 
we have in common with Wang et al. (2017), the Spearman’ rank correlations are 0.35, 
0.39 and 0.34 when 𝑣 =1.25, 1.5 and 2, respectively.  
More importantly, as reported in Table VI, regression results with respect to wealth 
and cultural dimensions are consistent with our main results with 𝑣 = 1.1. In addition to 
Iceland who has a negative loss aversion, Chile has been removed from the robustness 
test because of its implausibly high loss aversion (over 4) when v increases. Panel A shows 
                                                             
12 More detailed empirical results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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that loss aversion increases with wealth (GDPER) for 𝑣 = 1.25, 1.5 and 2 after control-
ling CGDP, DGDP, IF, and RE. Similarly, results in Panel B confirm that individualism 
increases loss aversion despite different values of 𝑣.13 
Finally, we investigate if our results still hold for OECD countries. The results ex-
cluding the five non-OECD countries (Brazil, Hong Kong, Pakistan, South Africa and 
Thailand) confirm that loss aversion increases with wealth and individualism (results not 
reported). Our results are also robust to Greece, which shows a large negative equity re-
turn during the sample period. Excluding Greece does not change the main results. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In assessing investors’ attitude to losses, one major difficulty is that all preference 
parameters are in theory, mutually intertwined, and thus estimating one for given values 
of others would not reveal what investors’ real preferences. In this paper, we propose a 
method that can estimate loss aversion, risk aversion, and subjective probability weights 
simultaneously in the multiple asset allocation problem. Our estimates of loss aversion 
are in general consistent with those estimated from international surveys.  
                                                             
13 As showed in Panel A, Table V, other cultural measures such as MAS, PD and UA 
can hardly explain loss aversion. We only report the results with GDPER as an inde-
pendent variable. 
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However, we find that investors become more averse to disappointments as wealth 
increases. In addition, among the four cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2001), individu-
alism alone is positively associated with loss aversion. A potential inference of this rela-
tion is that loss aversion might help reduce overconfidence: if investors are overconfident 
or optimistic towards a certain risky prospect, they may become increasingly disappointed 
at losses. Such cognitive dissonance may force investors to cool down and re-evaluate 
their situation. However, cultural dimensions explain investments in some asset classes. 
Highly individualistic or masculinistic investors prefer high risk and high return assets to 
bonds, whereas investors who dislike uncertainty prefer bonds to riskier assets. 
Finally, if investors are loss averse as well as risk averse, then the premium for a 
risky asset should reflect a compensation of disappointments from loss as well as risk. 
We leave the decomposition of the risk premium for future study. 
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Table I Asset Allocations of Pension Funds 
 
The asset allocations of pension funds of the 31 OECD countries are average investment proportions over the 
sampling period from 2004 to 2015. The "Other Investments" category includes loans, land and buildings, unal-
located insurance contracts, hedge funds, private equity funds, structured products and other mutual funds. If the 
OECD pension funds statistics does not have any records for a specific country, asset weights are substituted using 
some other similar indicators such as “Asset Allocations of Institutional Investors assets" or "Personal Pension 
Fund Assets". In the case no suitable substitutes can be applied, missing data are filled by the total average of 
available samples. Panel B reports Spearman rank correlation coefficients between investment proportions. 
 
A. Investment Proportions in Asset Classes  
Equity Bond Other Investments Risk-free Asset 
Australia 32.16% 9.36% 47.60% 10.88% 
Austria 31.44% 51.71% 10.98% 5.87% 
Belgium 22.36% 22.71% 47.58% 7.35% 
Brazil 17.52% 27.37% 55.04% 0.07% 
Canada 29.26% 29.60% 36.90% 4.24% 
Chile 25.96% 48.73% 24.02% 1.29% 
Czech Republic 2.96% 82.66% 5.59% 8.79% 
Denmark 18.75% 60.25% 20.25% 0.75% 
Finland 39.96% 38.21% 19.83% 2.00% 
France 34.68% 47.39% 10.30% 7.63% 
Germany 10.86% 36.49% 48.53% 4.12% 
Greece 4.13% 48.51% 4.97% 42.39% 
Hong Kong 53.00% 26.32% 6.96% 13.72% 
Hungary 8.49% 66.44% 19.98% 5.09% 
Iceland 25.17% 50.38% 18.50% 5.95% 
Israel 5.32% 79.45% 10.35% 4.88% 
Italy 12.63% 42.73% 38.89% 5.75% 
Japan 11.37% 36.21% 38.81% 13.61% 
Mexico 15.42% 82.13% 2.04% 0.41% 
Norway 27.81% 55.47% 12.63% 4.09% 
Pakistan 30.04% 43.49% 3.28% 23.19% 
Poland 41.08% 53.08% 0.96% 4.88% 
Slovenia 3.19% 63.91% 12.17% 20.73% 
South Africa 21.44% 7.34% 65.83% 5.39% 
Spain 13.22% 58.31% 14.90% 13.57% 
Sweden 20.88% 58.99% 15.70% 4.43% 
Switzerland 17.25% 24.85% 48.98% 8.92% 
Thailand 12.27% 67.27% 4.17% 16.29% 
Turkey 11.99% 57.09% 13.82% 17.10% 
United Kingdom 31.49% 24.70% 41.15% 2.66% 
United States 45.09% 21.67% 31.70% 1.54% 
World average 21.84% 45.90% 23.63% 8.63% 
B. Correlation Coefficients between Investment Proportions 
 Equities Bonds Other Investments 
Bonds -0.541   
Other Investments 0.037 -0.677  
Risk-free Asset -0.286 0.049 -0.313 
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Table II Summary Statistics of Annual Asset Returns 
Equity returns are measured by the composite index of the major stock exchange in each country. Bond returns 
are calculated with equal weights on the total returns of government and corporate bonds. Performance of other 
investments consists of four major assets on equal weights: real estates, infrastructure, hedge funds, and private 
equities. Four global indexes are utilized as the return proxies, which includes MSCI World Real Estate, Dow 
Johns Brookfield GLB INFRA, S&P Listed Private Equity and HFRI Fund of Funds Composite. Finally, risk-free 
rates equal to 30-day T-bill rates. If T-bill returns are not available, 30-day interbank rates or repo-rates are applied 
instead. The numbers in the round brackets are standard deviations of annual returns. The sampling period is 12 
years from 2004 to 2015. 
  
Equity mean Equity S.D. Bond mean Bond S.D. Other mean Other S.D. Risk-free 
Australia 8.34% 21.46% 5.55% 6.44% 9.07% 22.28% 4.53% 
Austria 5.25% 37.17% 5.29% 4.98% 8.40% 22.93% 1.55% 
Belgium 10.52% 32.47% 5.48% 5.81% 8.40% 22.93% 1.55% 
Brazil 10.20% 29.16% 5.62% 5.43% 8.84% 22.08% 12.13% 
Canada 6.75% 18.07% 5.35% 3.38% 8.61% 22.51% 1.65% 
Chile 8.89% 17.99% 9.34% 13.63% 8.49% 21.91% 0.34% 
Czech Republic 10.67% 25.38% 8.24% 16.03% 8.60% 23.16% 1.46% 
Denmark 12.64% 28.40% 5.82% 4.86% 8.41% 22.89% 1.77% 
Finland 6.71% 29.87% 5.16% 4.64% 8.40% 22.93% 1.55% 
France 7.31% 21.81% 5.27% 4.88% 8.40% 22.93% 1.55% 
Germany 8.39% 21.47% 5.15% 4.27% 8.40% 22.93% 1.55% 
Greece -14.45% 45.41% 2.96% 20.17% 8.40% 22.93% 1.55% 
Hong Kong 8.12% 29.61% 4.27% 2.67% 7.57% 23.34% 1.28% 
Hungary 6.99% 34.47% 7.56% 8.61% 9.04% 22.66% 6.42% 
Iceland -8.40% 70.19% 4.67% 2.78% 8.68% 20.60% 8.50% 
Israel 6.63% 28.12% 5.16% 4.89% 8.17% 22.93% 2.65% 
Italy 4.05% 24.90% 5.66% 6.66% 8.40% 22.93% 1.55% 
Japan 5.21% 24.91% 4.30% 3.20% 7.38% 24.21% 0.15% 
Mexico 15.56% 19.35% 7.58% 6.00% 8.74% 22.31% 5.56% 
Norway 10.14% 30.20% 5.84% 4.82% 8.62% 22.27% 2.64% 
Pakistan 14.79% 38.73% 8.78% 5.70% 7.67% 23.00% 9.32% 
Poland 6.42% 26.20% 6.66% 6.49% 9.20% 22.64% 4.07% 
Slovenia 0.67% 40.53% 4.39% 2.98% 8.40% 22.93% 1.55% 
South Africa 14.96% 16.62% 6.87% 5.54% 9.28% 21.99% 7.11% 
Spain 6.67% 21.16% 5.50% 5.37% 8.40% 22.93% 1.55% 
Sweden 11.39% 24.43% 5.76% 5.40% 8.75% 22.78% 1.53% 
Switzerland 7.22% 18.19% 5.09% 4.29% 8.23% 23.27% 0.45% 
Thailand 7.80% 30.65% 0.23% 17.56% 7.99% 23.22% 2.70% 
Turkey 11.24% 38.82% 8.87% 5.17% 8.70% 21.93% 11.09% 
United Kingdom 7.03% 16.64% 6.12% 4.83% 8.31% 22.64% 2.68% 
United States 7.39% 18.96% 5.25% 4.75% 7.56% 23.31% 1.29% 
World average 7.26% 28.43% 5.74% 6.52% 8.44% 22.72% 3.33% 
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Table III  Investors’ Preferences  
Panel A lists investors’ preferences for each country (region) estimated using GMM with annual data 2004-2015. 
Numbers in brackets are standard errors of estimates except for those in the World average which represents 
standard deviations. Panel B and C compare our estimates of loss aversion and subjective probability weight that 
are in common with Wang et al. (2017) and Rieger et al. (2015), respectively.     
 
A. Estimated Loss Aversion, Risk Aversion and Subjective Weighting  
  Loss Aversion (A)   Risk Aversion (Phi) Subjective Weighting (Delta) 
Australia 1.651 (0.009) 1.210 (0.005) 0.771 (0.010) 
Austria 1.819 (0.005) 1.158 (0.004) 0.792 (0.007) 
Belgium 1.809 (0.006) 1.438 (0.004) 0.698 (0.010) 
Brazil 0.603 (0.021) 1.494 (0.005) 0.807 (0.008) 
Canada 1.940 (0.017) 1.459 (0.010) 0.754 (0.027) 
Chile 2.040 (0.010) 1.520 (0.010) 0.503 (0.013) 
Czech Republic 1.968 (0.008) 1.477 (0.006) 0.808 (0.011) 
Denmark 2.205 (0.007) 1.504 (0.005) 0.861 (0.015) 
Finland 2.222 (0.008) 1.595 (0.007) 0.985 (0.009) 
France 2.050 (0.007) 1.534 (0.005) 0.915 (0.008) 
Germany 1.903 (0.006) 1.431 (0.004) 0.717 (0.009) 
Greece 0.331 (0.045) 1.460 (0.031) 0.903 (0.035) 
Hong Kong 2.168 (0.009) 1.384 (0.007) 0.589 (0.020) 
Hungary 0.925 (0.007) 1.008 (0.001) 0.534 (0.001) 
Iceland -0.112 (0.075) 1.441 (0.031) 1.551 (0.044) 
Israel 1.914 (0.005) 1.442 (0.003) 0.705 (0.008) 
Italy 3.348 (0.004) 1.415 (0.006) 0.703 (0.012) 
Japan 1.932 (0.004) 1.441 (0.003) 0.714 (0.009) 
Mexico 1.644 (0.016) 1.563 (0.008) 0.988 (0.016) 
Norway 1.953 (0.011) 1.468 (0.007) 0.779 (0.016) 
Pakistan 1.198 (0.042) 1.501 (0.006) 0.946 (0.030) 
Poland 2.317 (0.008) 1.184 (0.007) 0.669 (0.024) 
Slovenia 1.828 (0.006) 1.383 (0.003) 0.349 (0.009) 
South Africa 1.840 (0.013) 1.388 (0.008) 0.645 (0.018) 
Spain 1.952 (0.011) 1.467 (0.007) 0.784 (0.015) 
Sweden 2.032 (0.011) 1.520 (0.007) 0.893 (0.015) 
Switzerland 1.957 (0.010) 1.471 (0.007) 0.779 (0.017) 
Thailand 1.638 (0.018) 1.193 (0.010) 0.663 (0.018) 
Turkey 1.027 (0.021) 1.457 (0.001) 0.857 (0.003) 
United Kingdom 1.889 (0.009) 1.421 (0.006) 0.690 (0.014) 
United States 1.942 (0.011) 1.459 (0.007) 0.758 (0.018) 
World average 1.740 (0.644) 1.416 (0.131) 0.778 (0.200) 
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B. Comparison of Loss Aversion between our study and Wang et al. (2017)  
 Our Estimates Wang et al. (2017) 
Average  1.866 2.011 
S.D.  0.518 0.368 
Spearman Correlation 0.38* 
Number of Countries 27 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
     
 
C. Comparison of Subjective Weighting between our study and Rieger et al. 
(2011)  
 Our Estimates Rieger et al. (2011) 
Average  0.737 0.525 
S.D.  0.094 0.109 
Spearman Correlation 0.54* 
Number of Countries 21 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
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Table IV  Loss Aversion with respect to Macroeconomic Variables 
The table reports the results of panel regression. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of estimated loss 
aversion. From columns (1) to (6), we add controls including the scale of financial recourses (credit to private 
sector, as the % of GDP, CGDP); government’s debt ratio (debt to GDP ratio, DGDP); the individual wealth level 
(GDP per Capita, GDPER); investment freedom index (published by the heritage foundation, IF); political stabil-
ity issued by the World Bank (PSI) and regulatory efficiency (published by the heritage foundation, RE). Bold 
numbers represent significance at the 5% level. Numbers in brackets represent white heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors. Variance inflation factors (VIF) are checked simultaneously to ensure all control variables are free 
of multicollinearity issues. N represents the number of samples applied in regressions.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDPER 0.071 0.056 0.056 0.032 0.023 0.020 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
CGDP  0.115 0.144 0.124 0.122 0.039 
  (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.039) 
DGDP   -0.264 -0.240 -0.237 -0.229 
   (0.095) (0.093) (0.092) (0.087) 
IF    0.007 0.006 0.005 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PSI     0.043 0.024 
     (0.025) (0.026) 
RE      0.011 
      (0.003) 
constant 0.291 0.222 0.357 -0.051 0.009 -0.622 
 (0.042) (0.049) (0.051) (0.100) (0.123) (0.225) 
R-squared 0.119 0.133 0.186 0.232 0.237 0.257 
N 360 360 360 360 360 360 
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Table V  Loss Aversion and Cultural Dimensions 
Panel A presents regression results in different specifications. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
estimated loss aversion. We add control variables: GDP per capita (GDPER), Hofstede’s index of individualism 
(IDV); masculinity (MAS); power distance (PD) and uncertainty avoidance (UA). Iceland are excluded in Panel 
A for its negative loss aversion. Panel B reports regression results for the two other preference parameters in 
(natural logarithm of Phi and Delta) on Hofstede’s cultural measures. Panels C shows if investment proportions 
in different asset classes are affected by cultural dimensions. PD is not used as an explanatory variable because it 
is not significant in our preliminary tests. Bold numbers represent significance at the 5% level. Numbers in brack-
ets represent white heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Variance inflation factors (VIF) are checked simul-
taneously to ensure all control variables are free of multicollinearity issues. N represents the number of samples 
applied in regressions. 
 
 A. Loss Aversion with respect to Cultural Dimensions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDV 0.756 0.508 0.598 0.604 0.526 
 (0.157) (0.184) (0.188) (0.230) (0.238) 
GDPER  0.040 0.029 0.030 0.027 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) 
MAS   -0.227 -0.227 -0.124 
   (0.123) (0.125) (0.110) 
PD    0.028 0.185 
    (0.286) (0.300) 
UA     -0.395 
     (0.285) 
constant 0.096 0.106 0.208 0.187 0.378 
 (0.113) (0.116) (0.089) (0.204) (0.208) 
R-squared 0.145 0.165 0.176 0.176 0.200 
N 30 30 30 30 30 
 
B. The Effects of Cultural Dimensions on Investment Attitudes  
LN(Phi) LN(Delta) 
IDV 0.063 (0.103) 0.136 (0.214) 
MAS -0.203 (0.113) -0.015 (0.274) 
PD 0.117 (0.105) -0.126 (0.209) 
UA -0.014 (0.072) -0.018 (0.237) 
constant 0.363 (0.105) -0.300 (0.185) 
R-squared 0.203 0.052 
N 30 30 
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C. The Effects of Cultural Dimensions on Investment Proportions 
 Total Risky Asset Equities Bonds Other Investments 
IDV 0.158 (0.054) 0.032 (0.079) -0.233 (0.091) 0.359 (0.049) 
MAS -0.003 (0.036) 0.054 (0.059) -0.298 (0.116) 0.242 (0.105) 
UA -0.083 (0.026) -0.278 (0.078) 0.295 (0.138) -0.100 (0.119) 
constant 0.882 (0.054) 0.360 (0.102) 0.542 (0.091) -0.020 (0.050) 
R-squared 0.264 0.218 0.290 0.323 
N 30 30 30 30 
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Table VI Robustness Tests  
Panel A reports the results of regressing the loss aversion parameters on the individual wealth level (GDP per 
Capita, GDPER) when the loss aversion parameters are estimated with three different values of v. The control 
variables include the scale of financial recourses (credit to private sector, as the % of GDP, CGDP); government’s 
debt ratio (debt to GDP ratio, DGDP); investment freedom index (published by the heritage foundation, IF) and 
regulatory efficiency (published by the heritage foundation, RE). The coefficients on these control variables are 
not reported. In Panel B, loss aversion parameters are regressed only on the individualism (IDV) and individual 
wealth level (GDP per Capita, GDPER). In both two panels, Iceland and Chile are excluded because of its negative 
or extreme large loss aversion. Bold numbers represent significance at the 5% level. Numbers in brackets represent 
white heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Variance inflation factors (VIF) are checked simultaneously to 
ensure all control variables are free of multicollinearity issues. N represents the number of samples applied in 
regressions. 
 
A. The Effects of Macroeconomic Variables on Loss Aversion 
 v = 1.25 v = 1.5 v = 2.0 
GDPER 0.030 (0.006) 0.023 (0.005) 0.023 (0.005) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.282 0.236 0.292 
N 348 348 348 
 
 
B. The Effects of Cultural Dimensions on Loss Aversion 
 v = 1.25 v = 1.5 v = 2.0 
IDV 0.406 (0.214) 0.261 (0.120) 0.038 (0.110) 
GDPER 0.046 (0.223) 0.037 (0.018) 0.039 (0.019) 
constant 0.195 (0.281) 0.381 (0.072) 0.398 (0.066) 
R-squared 0.249 0.212 0.255 
N 29 29 29 
 
 
 
 
 
